A central factor in Malaysia's current political dynamics is fear of radical change or fear of the unknown. Let us call this the "fear factor". Despite a dramatic groundswell of dissatisfaction with the rule of the Barisan National government, fear of the unknown may yet prompt many voters to give their votes to theBN in the coming election. It is still difficult for voters to imagine what a new government under the Alternative parties would be like. Of course, the Barisan National knows that fear of the unknown is one of its best cards and BN forces are doing their very best to exploit the fear-factor to the maximum.

Fear of the unknown is natural and these fears must be addressed by the Alternative parties if they are to have ANY chance in the coming election. Several of the Alternative parties are showing signsthat they are keenly aware of this problem and are exploring ways to deal with it. Below we look at the pros and cons of different options for reducing the fear factor.

1. Don't aim for power - only aim to end BN's two-thirds majority The DAP's suggestion that the Alternative parties should not go for power but only seek the end of the BN's two-thirds majority clearly arises from a desire to allay fears of the unknown, especially the fears of radical change that are thought to be strong especially among the Chinese community. It is a serious effort to reduce voters' fears of voting for the Alternative parties.
Unfortunately, this strategy for dealing with the fear factor looks good at first but it has several problems. Firstly, the other Alternative parties are not going along with the DAP on this. Their loud calls for the BN to be toppled tend to reduce the effectiveness of DAP's efforts to allay fears. Secondly, claiming to not want power is not believable unless the Alternative parties only contest less than half of all seats. The Alternative parties have stated that they intend to contest every seat. Most voters are smart enough to realise that, whether the Alternative parties claim to want them or not, there is always the possibility that the opposition might win more than half of the seats. So some voters might still cast their vote based on the fear factor. This strategy may seem to insult the intelligence of the voters and might not actually do much to allay the fears of voters.

2. Play down the chances of winning
Instead of claiming not to WANT to win, a more effective and more truthful strategy might be to play down the CHANCES of winning. Some Alternative party figures and independent commentators have been emphasising this. This strategy does not insult the intelligence of the voters. The voters do not need much reminding that the chances of a victory for the Alternative parties are slim. More and more Malaysians are becoming aware of the unfair advantages that the incumbent BN has at its disposal and of the fact that by most standards, elections in Malaysia cannot really be considered to be conducted in a free and fair way or in a free and fair context. The Alternative parties and civil society in general must continue to highlight this unfairness.

However, playing down the chances of victory can also backfire. People like a winner and need some hope. The energy of the reform movement depends in part on hope that victory is possible and hope that reform will come. If the Alternative parties are TOO gloomy about their chances then their supporters may lose heart and the momentum of their campaigns may falter. (DAP's breaking the two-thirds majority goal also suffers from this problem).

Another problem with this strategy comes about because some of the BN's most effective dirty tactics depend upon the belief that the BN will win. For example, BN promises of development and patronage are only powerful if the voters believe that the BN will form the government. Likewise, veiled threats (or not so veiled threats) against areas which vote for Alternative parties are only threatening if the voters are convinced that the BN will actually be returned to power overall. So if Alternative parties feed the belief that a BN victory is certain then it tends to strengthen the effectiveness of these BN tactics. (Of course, again the DAP's breaking the two-thirds majority goal also suffers from this problem). Thus the Alternative parties need to tread a thin line when talking about their chances of victory. They cannot make an Alternative victory seem too likely because of the fear factor. On the other hand they cannot afford to make their struggle seem absolutely hopeless either.

3. Promise to Stick to the Common Manifesto
The forthcoming Common Manifesto of the Alternative Coalition can potentially be a powerful factor in reducing the fear factor. It has been reported that the AlternativeCoalition has now reached agreement to campaign on the basis of a common platform of a Common Manifesto, which leaves aside some of the more controversial policies of particular parties, and instead focuses on the struggles that all have in common.

The power of this manifesto in allaying fears depends on how it is handled by the Alternative Coalition. If voters suspect that individual Alternative parties will still try to push through their own controversial policies, even if they are not part of the Common Manifesto, then their fears may not be reduced.

One way to allay fears would be a pledge from each Alternative Party that for ONE term of parliament they will focus primarily on implementing the reforms in the Common Manifesto and ONLY those reforms.Another possibility is to spell out a number of changes that would NOT be implemented without a referendum. These referendum-only changes would be ones that are not in the common manifesto and which are the focus of BN fear campaigns. PAS's Hudud law proposals could be an example.

3. Address fears of domination by particular Alternative parties
Even if some voters are not convinced by promises above about the Manifesto, another factor that can allay certain fears is to make it clear that no single Alternative party will be able to dominate a new Alternative Coalition government. This can be ensured through the numbers of seats which are allocated to each alternative party. For example, neither PAS nor KeADILan is likely to contest in more than about 65seats but the Alternative Coalition needs 97 seats to form a majority. So there is no possibility that any single Alternative party can govern on its own, in the way that UMNO can if it wants to. DAP has also been trying to allay fears of an Islamic State by pointing out that PAS will not even contest in two-thirds of the seats and will then have no hope of pushing through any radical changes to the Constitution on its own.

4. Form a Shadow Cabinet
Another way to allay the fear of the unknown is to actually make it clearer to the voters exactly WHO they are voting for. This means the formation of a united Alternative Cabinet. In early July, a number of NGOs urged the Alternative Parties to get their act together to present areal alternative to the current BN government. These NGOs urged the Alternative Parties to present clear policies and to actually form a shadow cabinet, including an alternative Prime Minister. In most democracies it is normal practice for each opposition party or opposition coalition to name a Shadow Cabinet.

The formation of the Shadow Cabinet is probably more important than identifying the alternative PM. In any case, the Alternative parties are proposing that the powers of the Prime Minister should be reduced compared with now. Even the formation of a Shadow Cabinet would be a powerful message to voters, allowing them to decide whether they trust them to lead the country and reducing the fear of the unknown. The Alternative parties may fear that identifying Shadow ministers would expose them to focussed BN propaganda campaigns to discredit their abilities. It is probably worth this risk. Have the BN ministers shown such great capability?

The formation of a Shadow Cabinet is not an easy thing to do. The Alternative coalition's level of cooperation may not yet be solid enough to take this step. Furthermore, the difficult negotiations to reach such a point might put strain on their pact. Nevertheless, in the eyes of voters this would be a significant test of whether the Alternative parties are actually presenting a real alternative to the BN. It would do a great deal to reduce the fear of the unknown for voters.

5. Identify the Alternative PM and/or promise to reduce the powers of the PM
Speculation onthe identity of the PM under the Alternative coalition is another focus for BN fear-mongering. The BN has already tried to play up the notion that both Lim Kit Siang and Fadzil Noor want to be PM, knowing that each of these options would create a backlashamong different sections of the community. Identifying an Alternative PM with wide appeal is a difficult and controversial issue. But to reduce such fear-mongering the Alternative parties need to face up to this one way or another; either by naming an Alternative PM who has very wide appeal and/or by reducing the powers of the office of Prime Minister itself so that the issue is defused. If an Alternative PM is named then he/she will certainly become a key focus of BN attacks. But anyway, all of the relevant possibilities are already under intense attack (eg Wan Azizah, Fadzil Noor, Anwar Ibrahim). Perhaps Syed Husin Ali, despite the small size of PRM, would be a widely acceptable alternative PM, given his clean and moderate image and recognised skills, experience and knowledge. Even if no Alternative PM is named the fear-mongering from the BN over this issue will still continue and will have an effect on the voters.

6. Government of National Unity
A "Government of National Unity" is a government that includes most (if not all) of the major political forces in a country. This is yet another proposal to reduce voters' fears of change and of the unknown. Unity Governments are often implemented in countries that are facing a major crisis, such as war, civil war, internal unrest or which are making a transitionfrom an authoritarian government to a more democratic one. The aim is to provide breathing-space for a country to undertake major changes or a healing process without bloodshed. Ideally, a Unity Government includes most opinions (even opposing ones) and can help to ensure that differences are negotiated calmly, allowing passions to cool, and thus preventing instability.

A successful example of a Government of National Unity was South Africa under a transitional constitution for several years after the first all-race elections in 1994. Even though the ANC won a comfortable majority in those elections, the Government of National Unity (and the cabinet) included the National Party (the apartheid rulers!) and the Inkatha Freedom Party (arch rivals of the ANC).Even though some of the partners gradually left the government, it was able to ensure that the transition from apartheid was surprisingly smooth and peaceful. A recent proposal for a Government of National Unity was made in Nigeria. Right now, Indonesia would also appear to be a good candidate for such a Unity Government in order to oversee a transition towards greater democracy and to help heal old wounds. How about Malaysia?

In fact, there is a precedent in Malaysian history for a Unity Government. Theoriginal BN in the wake of the 1969 riots had some of the characteristics a National Unity Government. Three significant opposition parties (Gerakan, PAS and PPP) that had done well in the May 1969 elections were brought into the Government. As with mostUnity Governments the purpose was to implement major reforms as well as heal divisions (however imperfectly this may have actually been done). PAS returned to opposition in 1977 but Gerakan is still in the BN.

Is a Government of National Unity a possibility in Malaysia?

A credible proposal from the Alternative Parties for a Unity Government would reduce voters' fears of radical change. Arguably, a break from 42 years of government by increasingly autocratic UMNO-led coalitions is exactly the kind of difficult transition that calls for a Government of National Unity. At least one Alternative party has begun to seriously explore this idea. At the PRM National Congress in KL on 27 June 1999, the PRM President, Dr Syed Husin Ali said (translated roughly from the Malay):
"Views have been expressed that the people are not yet ready for great and shocking change. Because of that we need to seek other ways. Maybe the time has come to think about the concept of forming a Government of National Unity. This means that from an early stage the alternative parties can state that if they win a majority, nevertheless they will open the doors to good elements in the BN to join together in the formation of a government for national unity. This option is not too radical. Moreover, it offers a direction towards change in an evolutionary or gradual manner."

In order to best reduce voters' fears any Unity Government proposal would need to be workable and credible enough to convince voters that such a government is a REAL possibility if the Alternative parties win a majority. The proposal would also need to be acceptable to supporters of the Alternative parties who are understandably angry with the BN and suspicious of the BN. In order to be credible and widely acceptable, the offer to join a Unity Government would need to have certain strict conditions attached. It needs to be understood that under a Government of National Unity, BN PARTIES would be invited into the government as well as any individual members of Parliament who want to jump across. Such conditions might include saying that BN parties could only join the Unity Government if:
- they remove certain leaders who are tainted and unacceptable to the Alternative parties;
- they agree to a certain core set of principlesfor reform;
- in the case of UMNO, which may possibly still be the single largest party in Parliament, it would have to agree to take a relatively junior or secondary role, despite its numbers.

There are several potential problems. Firstly, BN parties will go to great lengths to DENY that they would EVER consider joining such a Unity Government, even if they lost the election. This is not a big problem, since voters can probably see through this. It is highly probable that, in the unlikely event that the BN did lose the election, some BN parties WOULD join a National Unity Government.

Of course, there would be problems with making a Unity Government work well. But the focus here is on creating a credible proposal that can reduce the fear of change amongvoters. There must be a sincere attempt to make a Unity Government work but it just may not be possible. Even if the Unity Government only lasts for a few months or a year, most of its purpose will have been served (namely to persuade many voters that a vote for the Alternative coalition is not too big a risk).

Unity Government if BN has a narrow victory?

The above discussion was based on a proposal to make the scenario of an Alternative coalition victory less frightening for the voters. However, Dr Mahathir has also tried to make voters fearful of a "narrow" victory for the BN, saying that this would bring about a weak government. A Unity Government proposal might also be one way to reduce this fear as well. The Alternative parties could counter by saying that even if the BN wins narrowly, they might be willing to join a National Unity Government, under certain very strict conditions. These conditions could focus on an end to the worst abuses of power and on democratic reforms with the aim of making the next election free and fair. If the BN is really so worried about having a weak government with a small majority then it should seriously consider such a Unity Government Proposal.

Conclusion

There are many ways for the Alternative Coalition to address the fear of change and of the unknown among the voters, without compromising their principles. The emphasis here has been on sincere proposals, not political gimmicks. Some of the options are more effective and politically possible than others. Some are bold steps while some are already being tried. All of the options need to be considered because unless these fears are reduced, the Alternative parties will have no real chance of victory.

By Zaitun Mohamed Kasim and friends
12 July 1999